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Fifty years after Nuremberg, the international community has again de-
cided to experiment with international war crimes tribunals.' The first such
panels were the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals constituted after World War
II to try suspected war criminals.2 The stated purposes for the establishment
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and Social Policy at SUNY Buffalo and the research assistance of D. Christopher Decker.
1. In 1993 the Security Council of the United Nations established on an ad hoc basis the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 [hereinafter
Yugoslav Tribunal]. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg. U.N. Doc. SIRES/808 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. 8081; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217 mtg. U.N. SIRES/827 (1993) [hereinafter
S.C. 827]; United Nations Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Para-
graph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993) (containing text
of the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal) [hereinafter Resolution 808 Report]; United Nations Sec-
retary General, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter International Tribunal
Aspects Report]. For an exhaustive analysis and documentation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, see
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, eds. 1996). In the case of Rwanda, the Security Council of
the United Nations established on November 8, 1994, the International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Human-
itarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Be-
tween 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 [hereinafter Rwanda Tribunal]. See United Na-
tions Security Council, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security
Council Resolution 955, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1994) [hereinafter Resolution 955 Report]. See
also Lyal S. Sunga, The Commission of Experts on Rwanda and the Creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. A Note, 16 HUM. RTS. L J. 121 (1995). See Paul C. Szarz, The
Proposed War Crimes Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia, 25 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 405 (1993).
2. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereinafter Nuremberg Tribunal) was
established in 1945 by the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis (otherwise known as the London Agreement, which resulted from conferences held among
the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to determine what policies the victori-
ous allies should pursue against the vanquished Germans, Italians, and their surrogates).
London Agreement, August 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544; Annex to the Prosecution
and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Charter), August 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East at
Tokyo [hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal] was established in 1946 by the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
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of both the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals by the United Nations are to
"put an end" to serious crimes such as genocide and to "take effective meas-
ures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them."'3 This
essay argues that both assumptions are unrealistic and that such tribunals will
have little or no effect on human rights violations of such enormous barbar-
ity. Moreover, the essay questions the motivations behind the formulation of
the tribunals and posits that the tribunals served either to deflect responsibil-
ity or to assuage the consciences of states which were unwilling to take polit-
ical and military measures to prevent or stop the Yugoslav and Rwandan
genocides. It contends, in any case, that from the start the tribunals were
intended to achieve neither the abolitionist impulses nor the just ends
trumpeted by the United Nations. The essay argues that the tribunals are
disarticulated, if not entirely irrelevant, to the political, reconstructionist, and
"peace" and "normalization" processes underway in Rwanda and the repub-
lics of the former Yugoslavia. It concludes that such tribunals would only
make sense in the context of an overall solution, a comprehensive and bold
settlement addressing the foundational problems that unleashed the geno-
cides in the first place. As it is, the tribunals now orbit in space, suspended
from political reality and removed from both the individual and national
psyches of the victims as well as the victors in those conflicts.
In the fifty years since Nuremberg, states have shown little stomach for
the international punishment of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, although treaties and normative canon proscribing such atrocities
NATIONAL AGREEMENTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27 (1946); Charter dated January
19, 1946, reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 27 (1946); Amended Charter dated April 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 4
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27
(1946).
3. See S.C. 827, supra note 1, at 29. The Security Council expressed its belief that the crea-
tion of the Yugoslav Tribunal for the "[p]rosecution of persons responsible for the above-men-
tioned violations [mass killings, massive and systematic detention, killings, and rape of women,
and 'ethnic cleansing'] of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such
violations are halted and effectively redressed." Id. pmbl. The International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda was established after the commission of experts formed by the Security Council to
investigate violations in that civil war recommended such a tribunal. S. C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3400th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/935 (1994) [hereinafter Rwanda Tribunal Statute].
The Rwanda Tribunal was created with some ties to the Yugoslav Tribunal. S. C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) (adopting and annexing the
tribunal statute). The members of the Appeals Chamber and the Prosecutor of the Yugoslav
Tribunal serve the same functions for the Rwanda Tribunal. See also Payam Akhavan, Enforce-
ment of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization [hereinafter Akhavan, Challenge
to Civilization], 8 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 229, 240-41 (1995). The Security Council resolutions
establishing the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals were binding on states because they were taken
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The deployment of Chapter VII of the UN
Charter was preferable to the creation of such tribunals by treaty because it "[w]ould have the
advantage of being expeditious and of being immediately effective as all States would be under a
binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an en-
forcement measure under Chapter VII." See Resolution 808 Report, supra note 1, 11 22-23.
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have increased. 4 Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, only two trea-
ties have referred to the creation of an international criminal tribunal to try
suspected offenders, with respect to genocide and apartheid. 5 The horrors in
Cambodia under Pol Pot, Uganda under Idi Amin, Guatemala under the mil-
itary, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, among many others, did little to push
states to national or international prosecution of heinous crimes against civil-
ian populations.6 Until the establishment in 1994 of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda Tribunals, the promise of Nuremberg stood as a cruel hoax, with the
exception of the questionable efforts by the post-Mengistu regime of Ethio-
pia to prosecute former Dergue officials for genocide and crimes against hu-
manity.7 Inaction cannot be blamed on the "paralysis" of the Cold War; the
ad hoc nature of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, as well as the lack of
progress on the creation of a permanent international criminal court today
are ample demonstrations of long-standing opposition by states to punish vi-
olators, let alone address deep-seated conditions which give rise to atroci-
ties.8 It is highly doubtful that a permanent international court, were it ever
4. German extermination of Jews during the Holocaust, viewed today as one of the clearest
instances of genocide, led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, approved December 9, 1948, S. Treaty Doc. No. 1, 81st Cong. 2nd
Sess., 78 U.N.T.S. 277, registered January 12, 1951 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The Ge-
neva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, prohibiting certain atrocities, soon fol-
lowed: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention No. II), August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention
No. III), August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention No. IV), August 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
5. See Art. 6, Genocide Convention, supra note 4; Art. 5, International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, UN GAOR, 28th Sess.,
Agenda Item 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3068 (1973).
6. See AMNrESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE Eiorrrus 130 (Uganda), 158-161
(Guat.)(1984); MIDDLE EAST WATCH & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ANFAL CAM-
PAIGN IN IRAOI KURDISTAN (1993); JAMES D. Ross, CAMBODIA: THE JusncE SYSTEM AND VIO-
LATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14-17 (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1992).
7. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT- 1994 131 (1994). For an account of the problems of
the Ethiopian prosecutions, see ETHIOPIA IN TRANSITION: A REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, INT'L HUMAN RIGHTs L. GROUP 28-31 (1994); Ethiopia: Accountabil-
ity Past and Present Human Rights in Transition, AMNESTY INT'L, Apr. 1995, at 46-53. See also
Ethiopix 'Red Terror' Detainees Finally Charged, Amnesty International News Service, Jan. 23,
1997.
8. Since WWI, efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court have been un-
successful. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of International
Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18 FoRHAwmw INT'L L. J.
1191, 1191 (1995). In 1994, the International Law Commission (ILM) submitted to the United
Nations' General Assembly a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court [hereinafter
Draft Statute]. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Ses-
sion, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994). Based on this
report, the United Nations decided to establish an ad hoc committee to review the Draft Statute
and convene an international conference to consider it. G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th
1997]
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to become a reality, would be a viable deterrent and an effective forum for
punishment of offenders given the large scale of abuses and the reluctance of
states to punish offenders. The main focus for the punishment of war
criminals must remain at the national level, although an international tribu-
nal would legitimize the criminalization of internal atrocities. It is the argu-
ment of this essay that the ugliness of war, the political reality of various
hatreds - racial, religious, and gender - cannot be isolated into an interna-
tional courtroom for resolution. Such a court would only make sense if it was
part of a comprehensive domestic and international process of punishment,
reconstruction, and reconciliation.
II. HYPOCRISY AND THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
Nuremberg was a patchwork of political convenience, the arrogance of
military victory over defeat, and the ascendancy of American, Anglo-Saxon
hegemony over the globe. Telford Taylor, the chief deputy prosecutor in the
American team at Nuremberg, provides a partial silhouette of this
construction:
The initial pressure for post war trials came from the peoples of the
German-occupied nations, but the assemblage of all the concepts in
a single package was the work of a handful of American lawyers, all
but Cutter (who was from Boston) from New York City. Some of
them (Stimson, McCloy) were what today we call "moderate"
Republicans; several (Rosenman, Chanler, Herbert Wechsler) were
Democrats. Elitist and generally accustomed to personal prosper-
ity, all had strong feelings of noblesse oblige. 9
As noted by Anderson, "Nuremberg was fundamentally an expression of
a peculiarly American legal sensibility."' ° While many in the German-occu-
pied lands wanted the trials, it was the Americans who pushed for them and
brought along the skeptical British." The other two powers, the French and
the Soviets, were merely ornamental: they were "brought in later, in order to
complete the 'Allies." 12 Thus, Nuremberg can be seen as an orchestrated
and highly-manipulated forum initiated primarily to impress upon the Nazi
leadership who the victors were and to discredit them as individuals, as well
Sess., Supp. No. 10, 11 2-3. See also Mark Thompson, Panel Puts Final Touches on Plans for War
Crimes Court, L. A. DAILY J., Aug. 23, 1996, at 1; Richard J. Goldstone, The International Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Case Study in Security Council Action, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 5 (1995); James Podgers, The World Cries for Justice, ABA J., Apr., 1996, at 52.
9. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 41 (1992). Taylor him-
self was a graduate of Harvard Law School who had held senior appointments within the legal
profession. Id. at x.
10. Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg
Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 281, 289 (1994) (book review).
11. Id.
12. Id. The Tokyo Tribunal, which tried Japanese civil and military leaders for waging a war
of aggression, was a naked American affair. It was dominated by American judges, prosecutors,




as discredit their particular philosophy of racial supremacy. The irony of Nu-
remberg, and the White men who created it, was that the adjudicating states
either condoned (or practiced as official policy) their own versions of racial
mythologies: Britain and France violently put down demands for indepen-
dence in "their" colonies in Africa and Asia while the United States denied
its citizens of African descent basic human rights.
It is not surprising, then, that Nuremberg did not demonize the German
people as a whole, although many Germans participated in, acquiesced to,
and supported the Holocaust and the countless horrible abominations of the
Third Reich. It mattered to the Allies that Germany be recast, shorn of its
ability to make aggressive war, because the West needed it in the reconstruc-
tion of Europe. This purpose would have been difficult to accomplish had
the trials satanized the German people as a whole and painted the evils they
committed as symptomatic of a national, genetic pathology.
The paltry numbers of those tried and convicted at Nuremberg -
twenty-two indictments and nineteen convictions - made a mockery of crim-
inal liability for the massive killings, torture, and other barbarities committed
by the Nazis. 13 While an estimated 3,000 more war criminal trials took place
in the national courts of other Allied powers utilizing international law and
the norms employed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the number is still too small
to account for such widespread offenses. 14 Prosecution was thus selective
and the creation of applicable law inventive, if not convenient. The concepts
of individual responsibility for international crimes was a departure, an inno-
vation, from existing customary or treaty law, as were the notions of crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity. 15 Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone attacked the Nuremberg trials in a most searing language:
So far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the application
of the power of the victor to the vanquished because the vanquished
made aggressive war .... I dislike extremely to see it dressed up
with a false facade of legality. The best that can be said for it is that
it is a political act of the victorious States which may be morally
right . . . It would not disturb me greatly ... if that power were
openly and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a
bad lot, but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the habili-
ments of the common law and the Constitutional safeguards to
those charged with crime....
Jackson [Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, chief prosecutor at Nuremberg] is away
conducting his high-grade lynching party in Nuremberg ... I don't
mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to see the pretense that
he is running a court and proceeding according to common law.
13. For a tabulation of the counts, indictments, and convictions at Nuremberg, see INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 12, at 168-69.
14. Id. at 171.
15. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT. LAW, PoLiTIcs, MORALS 100-02 (Henry
J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996). See also Francis Biddle, The Nuremberg Trial, 33 VA. L.
REv. 679, 694 (1947); TmE ANATOMY OF TiE N REmBERO TRIALS, supra note 9, at 41.
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This is a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my old-fashioned
ideas.16
The Allies found no problem in extending the reach of international law
to cover the actions of the Nazis. However, they took great care to exclude
their own conduct from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, conduct which did not
then violate international customary or treaty law but was nevertheless hor-
rendous, such as the massive bombing of cities with predictably high civilian
casualties. 17 The Tokyo Tribunal was even more blatant in excluding the cul-
pable acts of the Allies. It forbade any attempt by the lawyers for the Japa-
nese defendants to argue the defense of tu quoque, which would have
estopped the Allies from prosecuting the enemy for acts the Allies commit-
ted themselves.' 8 According to a distinguished judge at the Tokyo Tribunal,
the judges and prosecutors feared that allowing the defense of tu quoque
would have opened the door to defense arguments about the American fire-
bombing of Tokyo, which killed 72,000,19 and the nuclear bombardment of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.20
The lessons of Nuremberg for both the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals
are disturbing, to say the least. The prosecutions were sharply limited to
"major war criminals," even though Germany was completely defeated and
occupied, allowing the Allies access to most of the offenders and substantial
evidence.2' Political expediency and the West's desire to get on with the re-
construction of Europe and Germany appeared to have militated against the
prosecution of more offenders. It is considerably more difficult to try any
suspects - major or minor - where the conflict is inconclusive, without
clear victors and losers, or where there are political and logistical difficulties
in apprehending suspects.22 Despite its contribution to the international
criminalization of internal atrocities, Nuremberg serves as the model of the
triumph of convenience over principle, the subordination of justice to poli-
tics, and the arrogance of might over morality.23 Nuremberg gave future
generations a basis for talking about accountability for the most horrible
crimes; but it also emphasized the cynicism of power.
16. ALPHEus THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 715 (1956).
17. INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RioTs IN CoNTExT, supra note 15, at 102.
18. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 12, at 7.
19. Id. at 7, n.4.
20. Id. at 170. See also B.V.A. ROuINo, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND: REFLECTIONS OF
A PEACEMONGER (Antonio Cassese ed., 1993).
21. THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERo TRIALS, supra note 9, at 41; Anderson, supra note
10, at 291.
22. Anderson, supra note 10, at 291.
23. 111 at 281; INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 12, at 7. See Henry T.
King, Jr., The Judgements and Legacy of Nuremberg, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 213 (1997) (defending
the moral justness of the Nuremberg Tribunal).
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III. SHAME IN THE CREATION OF THE TRBUNALS
The atrocities in the Balkans had been predictable for some time. Since
the death in 1980 of Marshal Tito, the Croat who had ruled over Yugoslavia
since 1945,2 the seething caldron of historical ethnic hatreds among the
Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Slovenes had threatened to turn the
Balkans into a theater of war.25 Fighting in Yugoslavia broke out in 1991
when the Serbian Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) attacked Slovenia and
Croatia after they declared independence. 26 War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
started in April 1992 when JNA and Bosnian Serb units attacked Bosnia.27
Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia and Montenegro, the truncated Yu-
goslavia, fueled Serb nationalist sentiments with calls for Greater Serbia, and
support for the secession of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia.28 Amidst the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing war, the United Nations sent
peacekeeping forces, known as the United Nations Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR), in Croatia and Bosnia to create conditions for a peace settle-
ment, protect civilians in the so-called UN Protected Areas, and to assist UN
humanitarian agencies. 29
In the meantime, the Balkans had turned into killing fields. As early as
August 1991, JNA and other Serb forces had killed hundreds of civilians in
Vukovar, a city in eastern Croatia.30 According to a human rights report:
United Nations Personnel were aware of massive violations of
human rights and humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia soon
after fighting broke out between the Yugoslav Peoples' Army
(JNA) and Croatian forces in 1991 ... When Vukovar fell to the
Serbs on November 19, 1991, the UN Secretary-General's personal
envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, intervened to help
facilitate the evacuations of hundreds of patients from the city hos-
pital. He later learned that just hours before the evacuation, JNA
and irregular Serb forces had removed over 200 patients and staff
from the hospital and executed them outside the city.31
UN soldiers and civilian personnel who witnessed and reported these
accounts of violations to their superiors were told to be passive because they
had no authority to intervene or stop the abuses. 32 Whatever the reasons,
initial reports of killings were never made public or condemned by the UN or
24. Roger Thurow, to's Legacy: Political Drifting, An Economy in Chaos Prevail in Yugo-
slavia; Question is Whether Nation Will Turn More to Soviets Out of Economic Need; Sharpening
Ethnic Rivalries, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1986, available in 1986 WL-WSJ 258991.
25. Id.
26. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLA-
viA: 1991-1995 16 (1996) [hereinafter MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE].
27. Id. at 16-17.
28. Id. at 15-17.
29. Id. at 17-18.
30. Id. at 23.
31. MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 26, at 23.
32. Id. at 23.
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any of the major Western powers. 33 To make matters worse, the UN-
PROFOR presence in Croatia and Bosnia had proven ineffective in protect-
ing civilians or creating conditions for a peace settlement. Perhaps nowhere
was this failure more evident than in the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo and
their capture of large chunks of Bosnia, events which led to UNPROFOR's
evacuation of Sarajevo on May 16, 1992.34 After a Bosnian Serb attack on a
Sarajevo market in May 1992 killed twenty civilians, the UN Security Council
voted to impose sanctions on Serbia, which controlled Bosnian Serbs.35 But
it was not until July 1992 that the world would learn of the scale of atrocities
in the former Yugoslavia, thanks to the work of print and television journal-
ists, and especially Roy Gutman of New York Newsday.36 Television cameras
showed pictures of "hundreds of emaciated men behind barbed wire, their
eyes hollow from hunger and despair. ''37 Killings of civilians, as many as
hundreds of thousands, and the brutal rape of women became commonplace
in the war.
Only after the public knew what was happening in the former Yugosla-
via did the UN and powerful states start talking about a war crimes tribunal.
The Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals were not established because of the
United Nations, or the powerful states that control it. They were not estab-
lished because of an intrinsic value on punishing war criminals or upholding
the rule of law. Rather, the mobilization of shame by non-governmental or-
ganizations and especially the grisly pictures beamed to the world by the tele-
vision camera created a public relations nightmare and made liars of the
centers of Western civilization. The point is made by two writers of the Yu-
goslav Tribunal who were:
[c]lose observers of the Security Council reactions to published and
televised reports of mass rapes, murder, and torture as part of the
systematic Serbian program of "ethnic cleansing" reminiscent of the
Nazi genocide. Once the political will of the major powers was mo-
bilized by public shame and public outrage, Security Council resolu-
tions provided the legal basis for speedy action.38
In December 1992, Lawrence Eagleburger, the American Secretary of
State called for the creation of a Nuremberg-type war crimes tribunal.39 The
33. MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 26, at 23-24.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Paul Lewis, UN Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia; Air Travel and Oil
Curbed, N.Y. TnIEs, May 31, 1992, at 1.
36. Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serbia's War: Tales of Hunger, Torture at Camp in North
Bosnia, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jul. 19, 1992, at 7. Gutman exposed the horrible treatment of Croat and
Muslim detainees in Serb camps in Banja Luka and Tmopolje in Bosnia as well as the Manjaca
and Omarska camps. Id.
37. MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 26, at 24.
38. 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YuoosL.AviA xxi (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995) [hereinafter INSIDER'S GUIDE
VOLUME ONE]. See also David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401 (1994).
39. INSIDER'S GUIDE VOLUME ONE, supra note 38, at 30.
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creation of the tribunal appeared to be a pretext for military inaction either
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which the United States
dominates, or through a United Nations-sanctioned effort, such as the Amer-
ican-led conquest of Iraq and its expulsion from Kuwait in 1991. NATO sat
idly as genocide was committed in the center of Europe. It can be argued, as
Anderson has correctly observed, that a war crimes tribunal need not exclude
military action.40 NATO or the United Nations need not have seen the tribu-
nal as pre-empting the use of force to impose a settlement in the former
Yugoslavia, after militarily defeating the aggressors, and then calling to ac-
count the defeated perpetrators before a war crimes tribunal.41 This linkage,
or overlap, of military action and a war crimes tribunal, assumes that there is
no justice except the "justice" of the victors.42 While that may be partially
true, as evidenced by Nuremberg, it is one of the less desirable options. A
more lasting solution would require the genuine integration of force, diplo-
macy, and a tribunal. All three factors are essential for the production of a
fair and just outcome, one to which parties could psychologically be commit-
ted. They would also be more likely to pass it on as a lesson to their offspring
to avoid a recurrence.
Be that as it may, states went along with the Yugoslav Tribunal because
it was painless and temporary; a tribunal set up only with the limited man-
date of prosecuting offenders in the Yugoslav conflict. The tribunal also let
powerful states "off the hook;" they could no longer be accused of inaction.
Bosnian Muslims, the population which was the major target of the war
criminals, are European but they are not Western Europeans, white Chris-
tians, or Jews.43 It is unlikely that the atrocities perpetrated against them
would have been blinked at by major powers had they belonged to any of
those population groups. Moreover, Bosnia is neither a major strategic spot
nor an economically vital asset like Kuwait to major Western powers. In ad-
dition, the West seemed to defer to Russia because of its supposed historical
and cultural links to the Serbs.
The creation of the Rwanda Tribunal was perhaps even more cynical.
The events that led to its establishment were not dissimilar to those that
caused the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal. Rwanda went up in flames in
April 1994 after President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was killed in a mys-
terious plane crash while returning from neighboring Tanzania where he was
40. Anderson, supra note 10, at 293.
41. Id. at 293. According to Anderson:
[W]hereas too many world leaders, including some in the US government, welcome the
proposal for a trial because they see it as essentially a symbolic alternative to military
action, they cynically understand very well how the two are linked, but linked as a
reason for military inaction.
Anderson, supra note 10, at 293.
42. Id. at 292-93.
43. Sid Balman Jr., Croat: Serbs Created Modern Holocaust, UPI, April 8, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Peter Sarcevic, Croatia's ambassador to the Washington
was quoted as saying that "I personally was never expecting the Holocaust could happen again,
especially so close to the heart of Europe." Id.
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negotiating a settlement to his country's civil war.44 In 1994 the Tutsi-domi-
nated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which had been at war with the govern-
ment since 1990, demanding the return of Tutsi exiles and the introduction of
democracy, took power after a genocidal conflagration in which about
500,000 Thtsis were reportedly killed by Hutu government forces and
militia.45
If the former Yugoslavia suffered from international inaction, the world
seemed asleep, uncaring, as ominous clouds gathered over Rwanda, igniting a
murderous inferno as they touched the ground. Rwanda was further pun-
ished for the failures of the international community in the Somali debacle,
and the resultant big power "fatigue" from that crisis.46 Partly due to that
experience, and American marginalization of Africa, the United States re-
frained from intervening or pushing for effective international action to stop
the genocide in Rwanda.47 American racist stereotypes of "African con-
flicts" became the pretext for passivity as a top American official forbade the
use of the term genocide to describe the Rwandan holocaust.48 Thus, the
United States entered the region only after the RPF had emerged victorious,
and then only with the express mandate of airlifting supplies to refugee
camps in Zaire where at least one million Hutus had fled.49
United Nations inactivity and acquiescence to genocide was equally
damning. There were credible reports that the United Nations peace-keep-
ing force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been present to facilitate the
peace negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF, apparently
knew that a genocide might take place but the UN took no preventive ac-
44. HUMAN RiGHis WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995 41 (1994) [hereinafter WORLD
REPORT].
45. Genocide in Rwanda. April-May 1994 [hereinafter Genocide in Rwanda], HUMAN
RIGrHTs WATcH/AFRicA, May 1994, at 2; WORLD REPORT, supra note 44, at 39-48.
46. For the failures of United States and UN efforts in Somalia see Hussein H. Adam,
Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISNTEGRATION AND RES-
TORAnON OF LEGITIMATE AuTHORITY 69-89 (William I. Zartman, ed. 1995); Michael Begg, UN
Withdrawal From Somalia, IRISH TnMEs, Mar. 15, 1995, at 15.
47. Joyce Price, Why Rwanda Was Ignored, WASH. TnMEs, July 31, 1994, at A4.
48. WORLD REPORT, supra note 44, at 46. As powerfully put by Human Rights Watch:
Certain White House officials counseled that military intervention would be useless
because they believed that the war resulted from deeply rooted "tribal hatreds" which,
"because they had always existed," would continue forever. A few weeks after the
massacres had begun, when it had long been evident that genocide was taking place, a
senior member of the Clinton administration ordered officials not to speak of "geno-
cide" because the term could increase the moral pressure on the President and force
him to act.
Id at 46. Even if one could grant part of the argument that the tensions between Hutus and
Tutsis were in a sense historical, one could still not justify inaction on that basis. If that were a
valid premise for viewing conflicts with racial, ethnic, or religious dimensions, it would be sense-
less to expend resources on peace efforts between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East or Protes-
tants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. That is why such views and policies must be exposed
for what they truly are: racist excuses for inaction. See WORLD REPORT, supra note 44, at 46.
49. Craig Nelson, Rwanda. U.S. Keen to Prove its Concern over Refugees Plight, INDEPEND-
ENT (London), Aug. 1, 1994, at 9.
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tion.50 The April 1994 withdrawal by Belgium of its 400 UNAMIR contin-
gent and the failure of the remaining UNAMIR forces to intervene allowed
Hutu leaders to unleash genocidal massacres against Thtsis and moderate
Hutus.51 Later attempts by the UN to intervene were too little and too late.
As put by Human Rights Watch, "Shamefully absent at the moment of the
killings, the international community is now moving slowly [by establishing
the Rwanda Tribunal] to bring those guilty to justice."52
The RPF government, which should have welcomed the Rwanda tribu-
nal instead opposed it, in part because of the unwillingness of the interna-
tional community to stop the genocide and the fear that such a tribunal
would preempt its own authority to stage war crimes trials. 53 Manzi
Bakuramutsa, the RPF envoy to the Security Council, which cast the only
dissenting vote on the creation of Rwanda Tribunal,5 objected to it on the
following grounds: the tribunal would not address crimes committed between
October 1, 1990, when the war started, and July 17, 1994, instead of only the
1994 calendar year; the tribunal would likely sit outside Rwanda; the tribunal
would not have the authority to impose the death penalty; judges from cer-
tain states which were involved in the war would be biased; and that those
convicted would serve their sentences in countries offering prison facilities,
50. WoRLD REPORT, supra note 44, at 41. See generally JoINT EVALUATION OF EmER-
GENCY ASSISTANcE TO RWANDA, TmE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CoNFLIcr AND GENO-
CIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE, Vols. I-V (March 1996); see also, Peter J.
Rosenblum, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, 10 H~Av. HUM. Rrs. J (forthcoming
1997) (book review).
51. WoRLD REPORT, supra note 44, at 46. Human Rights watch has painted the picture of a
highly culpable UN and international community:
[Flollowing the plane crash [carrying President Habyarimana], the beginning of the
massacres, and the resumption of civil war, the UN and the US initially reacted with
retreat, confusion, and lethargy. This apparent indifference, combined with the lack of
any reaction by the international community to the massacres in Burundi in October
and November 1993, made the Rwandan Hutu extremists think that they could kill with
impunity.
Id. at 45. See also Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 45, at 2.
52. WORU REPORT, supra note 44, at 45. See also Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing
Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugoslavia, 22 DENvER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235 (1994).
53. Distrustful of the international community's ambivalence towards the killings of Tutsis,
the RPF government sought to try suspected war criminals itself, and thus opposed the Rwanda
Tribunal. As put by the Rwandese representative to the UN Security Council:
When the genocide began, the international community, which had troops in Rwanda
and could have saved hundreds of thousands of human lives by, for example, establish-
ing humanitarian safe zones, decided instead to withdraw its troops from Rwanda and
to abandon the victims to their butchers.
See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453rd mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994).
54. Anthony Goodman, UN Establishes Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, REUTERS NORTH
AMEmCAN WrE, Nov. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. The vote for
the creation of the Rwanda Tribunal in the 15-member Security Council was 13 in favor, one
(Rwanda) against, with China abstaining. China abstained because it felt that it was not a "cau-
tious act to vote in a hurry on the draft resolution and statute [establishing the Rwanda Tribunal]
that the Rwandan government still finds difficult to accept." I&
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instead of Rwandan jails.55 The Rwandan delegate concluded that a "tribu-
nal as ineffective as this would only appease the conscience of the interna-
tional community rather than respond to the expectations of the Rwandese
people."'56 Rwanda claimed that the absence of the death penalty against
those guilty of genocide was the primary reason for its opposition to the
tribunal.5 7
The establishment of the "other" tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal, was
possible because the Yugoslav Tribunal had set a precedent for such action
by the international community. The UN and the powerful states that con-
trol it could not reject a tribunal for Rwanda when they had set one up for
the former Yugoslavia; formally, white European lives were put on the same
footing with black African lives. The overlapping conflicts, which had been
so brutal and barbaric, had taken place in front of the television camera,
making it impossible to set up a process for prosecuting one group of perpe-
trators and not the other. Nevertheless, the Rwanda Tribunal was an after-
thought, a fact underscored by its grafting to the Yugoslav Tribunal. The
Rwanda Tribunal was in effect a sideshow to the Yugoslav Tribunal; the Pros-
ecutor for both tribunals was resident at The Hague as were the members of
the Appeals Chamber. The international press and the United Nations were
pre-occupied with the Yugoslav Tribunal and only seemed to give the most
perfunctory attention to the Rwanda Tribunal. Under the circumstances, it is
not difficult to conclude that big power cynicism deflated the seriousness of
the notion of international rule of law, an essential norm of civilization for a
diverse world.
IV. ASSESSING TIM YUGOSLAV AND RWANDA TRIBUNALS
Some leading international scholars see the mere establishment of the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals as a very significant event in the develop-
ment of the enforcement of international criminal and humanitarian law.
They see the importance of the tribunals in the footprints that they make on
the international law-making track and not in the substance of their perform-
ance in addressing the particular abuses with which they are charged. Theo-
dor Meron, a leading exponent of the international criminalization of internal
atrocities has written, with regard to the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals,
that:
55. Id. See also Rwanda. Urgent, AGENCE FRANCE PRFSSE, Nov. 8, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. For a more comprehensive look at the Rwanda's objec-
tions, see Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment [hereinafter Akhavan, Politics and Pragmatics], 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
501, 504-08 (1996).
56. Goodman, supra note 54.
57. Philippe Naughton, Rwandan Minister Defends "No" Vote on Tribunal, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Alphonse
Nkubito, the Rwandan Minister of Justice emphasized that those guilty of genocide must suffer
the death penalty since it was part of Rwandan law. He cited public pressure among the
Rwandese for the death penalty as the primary reason for RPF's opposition to the tribunal. Id.
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No matter how many atrocities cases these international tribunals
may eventually try, their very existence sends a powerful message.
Their statutes, rules of procedure and evidence, and practice stimu-
late the development of the law. The possible fear by states that the
activities of such tribunals might preempt national prosecutions
could also have the beneficial effect of spurring prosecutions before
national courts for serious violations of humanitarian law. 58
There is little doubt that the establishment of the tribunals affords the
international community an opportunity to develop international law with
respect to atrocities. While that effect is salutary, it does little to respond to
the real and graphic abuses and suffering of the victims in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia. Laws are less meaningful unless they can be applied or
enforced without prejudice to redress transgressions or unless they have a
deterrent effect such as behavior modification on the part of would be perpe-
trators. As Meron correctly notes, the haphazard creation of war crimes
tribunals is selective and subject to the whims of states.59 "What is needed,"
he categorically states, is "a uniform and definite corpus of international hu-
manitarian law that can be applied apolitically to internal atrocities every-
where, and that recognizes the role of all states in the vindication of such
law." 6" The enforcement of such law, however, is best accomplished by na-
tional courts although an international tribunal and a corpus of international
humanitarian law would illuminate this uncertain terrain.61 The pitfall is that
national courts may lack credibility with the group of perpetrators being
prosecuted, particularly if the group is ethnic, racial, or religious, and sees
itself as being persecuted by the victors. It may very well be the case that
such courts should be joint national and international efforts, to alleviate the
credibility problem.
While the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals respond to the lawyer's
gradualist approach to institutional and normative development, thus far
they have failed to successfully address the basic purposes for which they
were established. They have been hampered by logistical, structural, and
political considerations. Their lofty mandates have been tempered by the
political contexts in which they were set and the climates in which they
operate.
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Tribunal is broad and
covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,62 violations of the laws
58. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L
554, 555 (1995). See also Karl Arthur Hochkammer, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunak The
Compatibility of Peace, Politics, and International Law, 18 VANDERfiLT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119
(1995); Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law:
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 79 (1995).
59. Meron, supra note 58, at 555.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in 14 HUM.
RTs. L. J. 211 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal]. See Id. art. 2, See also 2 AN
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and customs of war,63 genocide,64 and crimes against humanity.65 The
Rwanda Tribunal has similar jurisdiction, except the internal character of that
conflict required different references to international humanitarian law. The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Yugoslav Tribunal appear to be
comprehensive and fair.66 The major criticism of the tribunals has not been
directed at jurisdictional or procedural issues but at the inability of the tribu-
nals to apprehend suspects to stand trial. This is particularly true of leading
suspects who are in positions of authority.67
Although the Yugoslav Tribunal was established in 1993 with its 11
judges,68 it was not until July 1994 that Richard Goldstone, a South African
judge was elected chief prosecutor after an embarrassing delay in which dif-
ferent states jostled to have their nationals appointed.69 Antonio Cassese,
the Italian international law professor, was elected President of the Tribunal
in November 1993.70 But it was not until November 1994 that the Yugoslav
Tribunal became operational, when it held its first public hearing.71 Human
rights groups decried the long delay, charging the U.N. with obstruction.72
To date, the Yugoslav Tribunal has done little to allay the fears of its skeptics.
Several structural shortcomings have worked against the effectiveness of
the Yugoslav Tribunal. One important limitation early on was the tribunal's
INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRiBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLA-
viA 29-38 (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995) [hereinafter INSIDER'S GUIDE VOL-
UME Two].
63. Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 62, at art. 3.
64. I& art. 4.
65. Id art. 5.
66. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.3 (1995). See also I.-
SIDER'S GUIDE VOLUME ONE, supra note 38, at 41-86; Repeating Nuremberg, ABA J., Oct. 1993,
at 121; Joseph L. Falvey, United Nations Justice Or Military Justice" Which is the Oxymoron?, 19
FoRDRA J. INT'L L. 475 (1995); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507 (1994); Alex C.
Lakatos, Evaluating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in the
Former Yugoslavia" Balancing Witnesses' Needs Against Defendants' Rights, 46 HASTn's LJ.
909 (1995). Note, however, that questions about the tribunal's sensitivity to issues of gender
have been raised. See Catherine Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavi, 17 HUM. RTs. Q. 649 (1995); Jennifer Green et al.,
Affecting Rules of Procedure for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and
Critique, 5 HAsTNcS WoMn'S Li. 171 (1994).
67. Akhavan, Challenge to Civilization, supra note 3, at 243.
68. Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 62, at art. 12. Three judges serve in each of the
Trial Chambers while five judges sit in the Appeals Chamber. Id
69. INSIDER'S GUIME VOLUME ONE, supra note 38, at 161-63.
70. Id at 148.
71. LAWYERS CoMMrrIEE FOR HUMAN Rioirrs, PROSECUTING WAR CRUIES IN THE FOR-
MER YuOosLAvIA iii (May 1995) [hereinafter WAR CRnAs IN YUGOSLAVIA].
72. Former Yugoslavia. The War Crimes Tribunal One Year Later, Human Rights Watch/
Helsinki, Feb. 1994, at 1.
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financial reliance on the United Nations.73 In March 1995 the UN still had
not resolved how the tribunal would be financed, leaving a voluntary trust
fund of US $6 million the only sure source of support.74 Apart from its finan-
cial woes, the tribunal's greatest failure has been its inability to apprehend
major suspects and bring them to trial. By March 1996, although the tribunal
had only indicted 53 suspects, only two were in custody.75 By June 1996, the
tribunal had only indicted 70 suspects, although these included Bosnian Serb
leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic for the slaughter of
6,000 Bosnian Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave.76 As late as February
1997, the tribunal had only indicted 74 suspects with only seven of them in
custody.77 Significantly, neither Karadzic not Mladic were in custody
although the two, regarded as the worst perpetrators, continued to live in
Bosnia.78
Since the Yugoslav Tribunal's mandate expires in the fall of 1997,79 it is
unlikely that it will bring to trial more suspects, whether low-level or senior-
ranking suspects. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal largely depends on the
states of the former Yugoslavia - principally Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia -
the perpetrators of war crimes themselves, for assistance to apprehend sus-
pects and to gain access to evidence.8 0 As the negligible numbers of those in
73. Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 62, at art. 32. The Statute of the Yugoslav
Tribunal obligates the UN to fund the tribunal. Id. See also Craig Topper, And Justice for All?
An Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 8 N. Y. Irr'L L. REV. 48 (1995).
74. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTs, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YuGosLAviA 33 (April 1995) [hereinafter CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL IN YUGOSLA-
VIA]. The UN Secretary General, had requested US $38,652,900 to cover the operations of the
tribunal for 1994-95 biennium, and so complained that the inability of the UN to appropriate
funds for the tribunal had forced him to allocate money without the proper appropriations
processes. Id.
75. War Crimes Warrant Issued for Serb, ATLANTA J. CONsTrrrrION, Mar. 8, 1996, at 12A.
76. Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal - Indictments, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jun. 27,1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
77. War Criminals Must Not Go Unpunished [hereinafter War Criminals], STATE J. REGIs-
TER, Feb. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. See also Barbara Frank-
lin, Bosnia: the New Nuremberg; UN Tribunal Finds that Justice May be Hard to Gain in a War
Zone, NAT'L L J., Sep. 26, 1994, at Al; Brenton L. Saunders, The World's Forgotten Lesson: the
Punishment of War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, 8 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 357
(1994).
78. War Criminals, supra note 77.
79. War Crimes Warrant Issued for Serb, STATE J. REGISTER, Feb. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
80. Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 62, art. 29. The provision requires states to
"cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution" of suspects. Id.
In particular, states "shall comply without undue delay" with request by the tribunal for "identi-
fication and location of persons," the "taking of testimony and the production of evidence," the
"service of documents," and the "surrender or transfer" of suspects. Id. See also Gerry Azatta,
Keeping Up With the War Crimes Tribunal Human Rights Research into the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 9 HAzv. HUM. RTs. J. 323, 326 (1996) (book review). See also Gary J. Bass, War Crimes
Tribunal Off to a Shaky Start, LA. DAILY J., Sep. 24, 1993, at 6; Doug Bandow, War Crimes
Tribunal Focuses on Politics, Not Justice, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 18, 1996, at 6; Mark Rice-Oxley,
Tribunal Depends on the Kindness of Foes, NAT'L LJ., Jun. 3, 1996, at A10.
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custody indicates, states have been reluctant to assist the tribunal in tracking
down suspects. In some cases, states have explicitly refused to cooperate.81
Short of imposing economic or other sanctions, a course of action that is
unlikely, the United Nations cannot force compliance by a recalcitrant state.
Because the tribunal cannot try a suspect in absentia,82 some commentators
have suggested that shaming through identification could turn indicted war
criminals into pariahs and deprive them of the freedom of movement.8 3
Most shocking has been the refusal of NATO and the United States to
arrest war crimes suspects following the American-brokered Dayton Accords
and the deployment of 60,000 troops in Bosnia. 84 Perhaps the reason lies in
the American reliance on Milosevic, the Serbian President many viewed as
the architect of the genocidal war, to broker the agreement. 85 In any event,
the Accords largely ratified the gains of the Serbs, leaving the Bosnian Mus-
lims with only fifty-one percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Muslim-Croat fed-
eration; the rest became Republika Srpska, a separate and autonomous Serb
republic, and a haven for Karadzic and Mladic. 86 The Dayton Accords
charged neither the NATO forces nor the signatory states with finding and
arresting indicted war criminals.87 The Yugoslav Tribunal remains a symbolic
gesture without the wherewithal to discharge its mission. The United States
fears that going after suspects would upset the Dayton Accords.88 In any
event, both the United States and NATO forces have carried out a policy of
appeasement towards indicted war criminals.8 9
81. Croatia Defies Tribunal, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File (stating that Croatia recently refused to turn over information on
suspects). See also Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law:
Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DuKE J. CoM. &
INT'L L. 79 (1995); Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via: Problems and Prospects, 18 FLETc-mR F. OF WORLD AFF. 7 (1994).
82. Statute of Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 62, art. 20. The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribu-
nal, art. 20 requires that an accused be in custody before the commencement of a trial. Id. See
also Ruth Wedgewood, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 267 (1994).
83. Akhavan, Challenge to Civilization, supra note 3, at 243-44. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1993) (Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the
UN, declaring that war crimes suspects will become international pariahs and prisoners in their
own lands - Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia - even if their own states do not hand them over for
trial). See also War Criminals to Become International Pariahs, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, May
26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
84. E. Sciolino, Accord Reached to End the War in Bosnia; Clinton Pledges U.S. Troops to
Keep Peace, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 22,1995, at Al. The Dayton Accords were initialed on November
21, 1995, by the presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia in Dayton Ohio, ending
the four-year war in the former Yugoslavia. Id.
85. Dissembling in Serbia, AsIAN WALL STREET J., Feb. 10, 1997, at 12, available in
WESTLAW, Intlnews.
86. MEDIcIm UNDER SIEGE, supra note 26, at 32.
87. Id. at 32.
88. Dissembling in Serbi, supra note 85.
89. War-Crimes Hypocrisy, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at C6 (attacking American policy of
appeasement of war crimes suspects, reconfirmed when Secretary of State Albright met with
Louise Arbour, the new Yugoslav Tribunal Prosecutor). WASHINGTON POST editorial concludes
war crime suspects "have not been arrested because U.S. troops have chosen not to arrest them
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The Rwanda Tribunal, on the other hand, has met with a number of
difficulties of its own and has not, as result, done much better than its Yugo-
slav counterpart. What should be clear at the outset, however, is that the
Rwanda Tribunal, no matter how successful it becomes, will never compen-
sate for the inaction of the international community as the genocide took
place in 1994. The tribunal was established in November 1994 with investiga-
tive and prosecutorial units in Kigali, and the appointment of Honore
Rakotomanana, a retired chief justice from Madagascar as its the deputy
prosecutor to serve under Richard Goldstone.90 But it was not until June
1995 that its judges were sworn in at The Hague although the tribunal's seat
was Arusha, Tanzania.91 An administrator for the tribunal was not ap-
pointed until September 1995.92 The Rwanda Tribunal was given the same
subject-matter jurisdiction as the Yugoslav Tribunal: genocide, 93 crimes
against humanity,94 and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Con-
ventions and of Additional Protocol II.95
One year after it was established, the Rwanda Tribunal issued its first
indictments on December 12, 1995, accusing eight Rwandans of genocide.96
The Rwanda Tribunal, unlike its Yugoslav counterpart, has netted several
high-ranking officials of the former regime. In addition to several other sus-
pects, the Tribunal has in its custody Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the per-
manent secretary in the Ministry of Defense of the former regime, thought to
have been one of the masterminds of the genocide.97 Bagosora was arrested
- because ultimately, President Clinton has failed to order their arrests." Id. See also Discus-
sions, But No Plans Yet on Catching War Criminals: Pentagon, AGENCE FRANcE PRESSE, Feb. 11,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
90. WA CRIMES IN YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 71, at 36.
91. Julian Bedford, Judges to Set Rules for Rwanda Genocide Tribunal, REUTERS, Jun. 26,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Judge Laity Kama of Senegal and
Judge Yakov Ostrovsky of Russia were elected president and vice-president of the tribunal re-
spectively. Id. See UN Panel Opens Inquiry on Rwanda, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 28, 1995, at A5.
92. Kenyan Appointed to Top Job on War Crimes Tribunal, REUTERs, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File. Andronico Adede, a Kenyan UN bureaucrat was appointed the
tribunal's register on September 12, 1995. Id.
93. Rwanda Tribunal Statute, supra note 3, art. 2.
94. Id. art. 3.
95. Id. art. 4. Article 4 requires the tribunal to apply international humanitarian law, partic-
ularly the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of Victims of War, and the
1977 Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Conventions I-IV,
supra note 4. See also Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977). The inclusion of the Second Protocol was essential because the Rwandan
conflict was internal. Id. See also Mark R. von Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and
Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and the 'Elementary Dictates of Human-
ity,' 22 BROOK. J. INr'L L. 112 (1996); Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal for
Rwanda. Opportunities for Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 177 (1995).
96. Akhavan, Politics and Pragmatics, supra note 55, at 509. See also Melissa Gordon, Jus-
tice on Triak the Efficacy of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INr'L & CoMP. L.
217 (1995).
97. Akhavan, Politics and Pragmatics, supra note 55, at 509.
1997]
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J.
in February 1996 in Cameroon and was extradited to stand trial. Three other
former high-ranking officials who are expected to stand trial with Bagosora
are Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of the military intelligence; Ferdi-
nand Nahimana, head of the Rwanda Information Office and co-founder of
Radio Mille Collines which urged the genocide; and Andre Ntagerura, minis-
ter for transport.98 All three were extradited from Cameroon in January
1997. 99 As of February 20, 1997, their trials had not started.10°
The arrests of these prominent suspects have been overshadowed by the
tribunal's financial and administrative difficulties. The tribunal's first hearing
was held in January 1997 amidst charges of corruption and mismanagement
at the tribunal.1 1 An investigation of the Rwanda Tribunal conducted by the
United Nations was highly critical of the entire effort, from the tribunal itself
to the United Nations offices in New York. 1°2 The investigation was re-
quested by concerned member states, UN staff, and the UN Office of Inter-
nal Oversight Services.' 03 The report found that the tribunal's Registry had
no accounting system; that the tribunal had incomplete and unreliable finan-
cial records; unqualified staff; disregard of UN regulations; shortage of cells
and courtrooms; lack of lawyers and investigators; lack of logistical, trans-
port, and office equipment; and neglect of the tribunal by UN headquarters
in New York.1°4 In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali was rid-
dled with operational difficulties and feuded openly with the Registry in
Arusha. 0 5 These problems together with lack of funding, the geographical
separation of the Registry from the Prosecutor's Office, and poor infrastruc-
ture have hindered the effective establishment of the tribunal and its work. °6
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The investigative report, which concluded that the Rwanda Tribunal was
dysfunctional in virtually all areas, recommended, inter alia, that the UN pro-
vide the tribunal with more administrative and financial support, and that
more guidance and cooperation with the Yugoslav Tribunal be forged to im-
prove its performance. 107 Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General met with
senior officials from the Rwanda Tribunal in February 1997 and immediately
fired Registrar Adede and Deputy Prosecutor Rakotomanana, the two senior
officials identified in the investigative report as largely responsible for the
Tribunal's woes. 108 If the UN and its officials can take the Rwanda Tribunal
seriously by engaging competent staff and funding it adequately, it may at
least conclude a few cases before its time expires. Even with the cooperation
of the Tutsi-led Rwanda government, it is not feasible that a substantial
number of the reported ninety-thousand suspects in Rwandan jails will ever
be tried by the tribunal.' 0 9 From a practical standpoint, many of the suspects
will have to be tried by the national courts of Rwanda, although those trials
raise serious questions of due process protections." 0
V. CONCLUSION
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals are bad analogies for the Yugoslav
and Rwanda Tribunals. While the former represented the calculated revenge
of the victors, they had little to do with justice per se. Instead, the Nurem-
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berg and Tokyo Tribunals culminated in a war of the titans: the Allies against
the Axis, and the final closure, the entombment of the aggressors. That is
why, as Anderson states, the Allies were able in Nuremberg to turn the ugly
war into court proceedings about two-dozen defendants, a crowning cere-
mony of their victory. As he writes:
[t]o turn the world to a courtroom, to legal memoranda and plead-
ing and paperwork, is possible only once an army sits atop the van-
quished enemy. Otherwise, the enormity of the crimes left
unaddressed out in the hills of Bosnia so dwarf those raised before
the tribunal that it mocks justice. A trial, Nuremberg taught, puts the
symbolic seal of justice on what armies have rectified with force."1
An indictment of the Yugoslav Tribunal sees such trials - before the
perpetrators are conquered - as an attempt to appease the killers, to ratify
genocide. Anderson notes this view when he writes that "[tlo hold a war
crimes trial in the former Yugoslavia today would be like holding Nuremberg
after acquiescing in the German annexation of Poland, the Ukraine, and the
rest of the eastern lands."112
That is more or less what in fact has happened. The Dayton Accords
ratified the crimes of the "ethnic-cleansers" and the maps that they drew with
their guns. They recognized the sovereignty of the states responsible for the
genocide and hence their protection of the authors of the crimes themselves.
In the meantime, the Yugoslav Tribunal sits at The Hague, with its jurisdic-
tion about to run out, and precious little to show in its justification. There
have been no attempts to integrate the tribunal into the political processes of
reconstruction and reconciliation. The irony, indeed paradox, of UN efforts
in the former Yugoslavia is the prosecution of war criminals with whom it
also seeks to make peace. As such, its teeth will never be felt by those whom
it was intended to address.
From a distance, it is possible to see the Rwanda Tribunal as different
from the Yugoslav Tribunal and as an approximation of Nuremberg. The
temptation to equate the military defeat of the Hutu regime by the Tutsi RPF
and their removal from office with the Nazis is incorrect. Such analogy
would only make sense if the targets of the Holocaust - Jews - had them-
selves defeated the Germans and taken control of the state. The war in
Rwanda is unfinished; there is only a temporary respite before the Hutu-
Tutsi struggle for the control of the state resumes. Unless the Tutsi RPF gov-
ernment organizes genuine democratic elections, which it would lose because
Hutus would come back to power, the prediction of at least one more cycle of
violence is certain to be fulfilled as Hutus, who make up ninety percent of the
country, seek to reclaim control. There is little doubt that it is in this context
that the Rwanda Tribunal is seen by Hutus, as international punishment by
111. Anderson, supra note 10, at 292 (emphasis added).
112. Id See also Dusan Cotic, Introduction: A Critical Study of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CrM. L.F. 223 (1994).
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the victors, Tutsis with the blessing and support of the United Nations. 113
Thtsis may themselves see the tribunal and the war crimes they are con-
ducting in Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge. 11 4 For that reason, the
Rwanda Tribunal, since it is not part of an overall political settlement of the
Hutu-Tutsi struggle for political power, is virtually irrelevant to the future of
Rwanda. 115 Finally, the failure of both tribunals will make the establishment
of a permanent international criminal tribunal that much more difficult." 16
113. Credibility of the Rwanda Tribunal is unlikely to materialize among Hutus because
they are its main targets. The prosecution of Titsis is essential for the tribunal's legitimacy. In
the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal, the prosecution of Bosnians and Croats - and not just Serbs
- would enhance that tribunal's legitimacy in the eyes of perpetrators across the board.
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the RPF government wanted the Rwanda Tribunal situated in Rwanda so that it would teach the
"Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the impunity to which it had become accustomed...
and to promote national reconciliation." But this is only possible if the tribunal enjoys some
credibility with the perpetrators. Id.
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